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12 JUN 72

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CRS

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : Automatic Dissemination

1. I have reviewed your draft memorandum on automatic dissemination and, as you anticipated in your covering memorandum of 12 June, do have a few comments on your proposal. My immediate concern--looking at your draft from an Agency and not just a Directorate point of view--is that the proposal for the Office of Communications to proceed with the development of an automatic dissemination system of all electricals is, in my view, the wrong decision.

2. My concern about your proposed decision is also heightened by the fact that it apparently was taken without a careful reading of the positions presented by CRS in the joint OC/CRS memorandum of 24 March 1972 on the automation of cable dissemination. I realize now that I should have been more aggressive in presenting the MAD case and less confident in assuming that its merits alone would sustain it.

3. I in no way object to your desire to improve the speed and security with which the Agency's own traffic needs to be transmitted from the field and disseminated to the appropriate action components in Headquarters. But I must point out that these same tests of speed and security are not as applicable to the substantive traffic coming into this Agency from non-CIA originators. A substantial part of incoming traffic--NSA electricals [REDACTED] is already disseminated automatically and with great effectiveness by the MAD system. The MAD system could without significant additional cost undertake to implement a system of automatic dissemination of all State and

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Defense electrical traffic. Thus, I find it very difficult to understand and to accept a decision to do away with MAD, a cheap, effective, and operating system.

4. I can understand the communicator's feeling that dissemination is an integral element of the transmission of messages. But this approach overlooks the fact that a system of mechanical delivery of messages to addressees is only a beginning step in the intelligence function. I fear that the Act II system would do little more than duplicate the U. S. Postal Service function of delivering mail to an address. It would fail in the most important aspect of dissemination--reading the mail to be sure it gets to the analyst on the basis of its substantive content. As the largest consumer of substantive traffic, I cannot, therefore, regard this anticipated deterioration of service with anything but great concern. I, therefore, recommend that you take the time to personally read those portions of the 24 March memorandum that pertain to the MAD system and reconsider your draft proposal.

5. I would also note that your recommendation "h" is a separate topic requiring considerable study, both as to its need and feasibility, as well as its impact on resources and security.

6. Specifically, my recommendations at this point are as follows:

a. That ACT or any other appropriate system should be developed for the dissemination of that CIA-originated traffic which is sensitive to considerations of speed and security.

b. That the MAD system continue to handle the electrical dissemination of NSA traffic [REDACTED] and that CRS start the procedures necessary to transfer DoD and State traffic to MAD dissemination.

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EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence

ADDI/PVWalsh/tb (12 June 72)

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